Network interventions can help to achieve behavioural change by inducing peer-pressure in the network. However, inducing peer-pressure without considering the structure of the existing social network may render the intervention ineffective or weaker. In a seven-week school-based field experiment using preadolescents' physical activity as a proxy for estimating behavioural change, we test the hypothesis that boys' and girls' distinct networks are susceptible to different social incentives. We run three different social-rewards schemes, in which classmates' rewards depend on the physical activity of two friends either reciprocally (directly or indirectly) or collectively. Compared with a random-rewards control, social-rewards schemes have an overall significantly positive effect on physical activity (51.8% increase), with females being more receptive to the direct reciprocity scheme (76.4%) and males to team (collective) rewards (131.5%). Differences in the sex-specific sub-networks can explain these findings. Network interventions adapted to the network-specific characteristics may constitute a powerful tool for behavioural change.
P eer-to peer interactions can be an important source of social influence in the diffusion of ideas and behaviours in both physical and digital social networks 1 . The quality characteristics of interpersonal ties and interactions (for example strength, direction, frequency, locality) among the members of the network determine the magnitude of peer-pressure exerted by one peer on another and eventually the size of social influence in the network 2 . Network induction or alteration interventions 3 can achieve behavioural change by changing or fixing some of these quality characteristics. However, different subgroups of individuals with different quality characteristics and/or conflicting interests may exist within the same network (sub-networks). This makes it difficult to isolate the effect of different network interventions difficult 4 . In this study, we take advantage of the controlled environment of sex-segregated school-class networks 5 to induce different network interventions (based either on collective or on reciprocal interaction schemes) and measure their impact in boys' and girls' distinct sub-networks 6, 7 . As obesity and physical fitness have been established in the literature as 'contagious' concepts [8] [9] [10] [11] , we use physical activity as a proxy for conceptualizing behaviour and estimating behavioural change. As changing usual behaviour and habits is a complex task 2 requiring focused interventions, further generalization of the results should be made with caution.
Introducing social norms or inducing peer-pressure can both result in social influence. In the first case, individuals are not required to take any conscious action while contagion happens through observation and copying others' behaviour, perceived (or presented or induced in the context of network interventions) as social norms (descriptive or injunctive) [12] [13] [14] . In the second case, the focus of this study, peer-pressure requires individuals and peers to make conscious decisions to exert pressure 15 as a response to a specific external stimulus that inter-relates the welfare of the peers. One can consider that in this case, too, a new social norm is created and maintained at least for the period during which an external stimulus exists 16, 17 . The power of social influence in various socioeconomic areas is highlighted in several empirical studies (see review 18 ). Recent field-, laboratory-and internet-based network experiments or interventions have demonstrated a role for peer-pressure in social mobilization for problem solving 19 , product adoption 1 , health behaviours 20 or altruism 21 ). Peer-pressure plays a particularly important role in the promotion of cooperative behaviour 22 . In evolutionary biology, it is well established that cooperation evolves through different mechanisms 23 that all work by exploiting the local-dyadic interactions (that is direct reciprocity, kin selection), the global-network interactions (that is indirect reciprocity) or both (that is network reciprocity, group selection). Social influence in general, and peer-pressure in particular, can be intentionally induced through carefully designed network interventions targeting socially desirable outcomes. The term "induction interventions" was introduced by Valente to classify interventions that stimulate or force peer-to-peer interactions to create cascades in information or behavioural diffusion 3 . Moreover, interventions in the network structure either by adding or deleting nodes and links, or by rewiring existing links, are classified as "alteration interventions". The experiment presented here incorporates elements from both types of interventions. Building on a theoretical model 24 (and its experimental application 25 ), we induce peer-pressure by reallocating individuals' positive externalities towards their friends. The performance of an individual affects only and repeatedly his/her closefriends' payoffs. At the same time, we intervene in the structure of the network by suspending any rewiring process that would naturally emerge 26, 27 as a reaction to the negative (that is, lack of positive) externalities suffered by an individual due to his/her close-friends' adverse performance-a process which in evolutionary game theory is dubbed "spatial selection" 15 or "link reciprocity" 28 . Exerting peer-pressure towards harmful (not beneficial) friends is the only alternative reaction to be taken by someone who is interested in improving his/her personal payoff. Physical activity is used in this study as a 'behavioural proxy' for estimating the size of behavioural change after our interventions. However, it was also chosen for its importance to children's physical and mental health 29 ; developing and evaluating effective interventions to increase physical activity in children is a public health priority 30 and one of the core points of our study. We approach the promotion of physical activity as a 'complex contagion' problem 2 which requires multiple exposures to a stimulus (our experimental incentives) reinforced by multiple strong-tied sources (participants' friends). Using peer-pressure induction and network-rewiring suspension as basic principles, we designed three different social-rewards schemes, based on team (collective) 26, 31 , direct reciprocal 21 or indirect reciprocal 32, 33 interaction schemes, and tested them, together with the individual reward scheme 34, 35 , against a random reward scheme, which represents our control condition.
We conducted the study in two experimental phases (see Methods), with ten fifth-grade elementary-school classes (that is, 9-11-year-olds) participating in the winter phase (92 females and 84 males from seven schools) and nine different classes in the spring phase (85 females and 88 males from eight schools). Each class participated in only one of the experimental conditions, while classes from the same school and phase were assigned to the same condition to avoid contamination. Following ethical and data protection approval (see Methods: Ethical approval), and parental consent, network-data were collected with the help of the class teachers who served as mediators between students and researchers throughout the experiment to preserve students' anonymity. For the same reason, researchers also avoided collection of any other data not directly linked to the intervention (for example socioeconomic data). The strength of all dyadic ties (1 ≤ τ ij ≤ 5) between any two classmates i and j was elicited through a self-reported network questionnaire. This information was then used for the formation of interacting teams or pairs (consisting of same-sex relatively good friends (τ ij ≥ 3 and τ ji ≥ 3), henceforth partners) in the socialrewards schemes. Inducing same-sex groups was both fair, owing to the known sex differences in physical activity 36 , and also natural, owing to the existence of sex homophily in the actual networks (E-Iindex(τ ij = 5) = − 0.54, P value < 0.001; see ref. 37 , Supplementary Notes: Network analysis, and Supplementary Figs. 7,8).
In both winter and spring phases, following a 1-week preliminary period (p 0 ), each school was randomly assigned to one of five study conditions and received the corresponding instructions about incentives, rewards and grouping information (where applicable). The interventions were conducted in parallel for five consecutive weeks divided into four periods: three 1-week-long periods (p 1 , p 2 and p 4 ) and one longer period (p 3 ) of 2 weeks. Data were also recorded for an additional 1-week-long post-experimental period (p 5 ) in which students did not receive any kind of incentive or reward.
Physical activity was continuously recorded using accelerometers (see Methods) throughout the 7-week experiment (except for the days in which data had to be extracted and prepared for participants' feedback; see Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Using cut points as identified in ref. 38 , minutes spent in moderate-to-vigorous physical activity (MVPA; > 2,296 counts per minute (c.p.m.)) was communicated to participants as "minutes of intensive physical activity". This information was given to each participant individually (in a sealed envelope) at the onset of each period (for all p t ≥ 1 ) together with information on their absolute performance, their relative classification (described as gold, silver or bronze medal) and the corresponding points (100, 80 or 60) obtained in the previous period (p t − 1 ). In the same letter, boys and girls were also informed about the sexspecific upper and lower thresholds for achieving one of the classification medals in p t . These thresholds corresponded to the upper and lower tertiles of boys' and girls' physical activity distributions in p t − 1 (see Methods: Physical activity measurement and feedback). In the social-rewards schemes, participants were also informed about the relative performance and points of their partners.
The different experimental conditions assigned to the school classes defined the allocation rules of the points earned. In the individual reward scheme, participants received the points corresponding to their own relative performance. In the social-rewards conditions, points were dependent not on their own but on partners' performance ( Fig. 1 ). In the direct and indirect reciprocity schemes, each individual's points were divided between two partners (point-takers), while they themselves received half of the points from each of the same (in direct reciprocity) or other (in indirect reciprocity scheme) two partners. Finally, in the team scheme, three partners were assigned to the same team and engaged in a sharing scheme similar to a public goods game 39 ; the points of all team members were summed and then shared equally among them. At the end of the experiment (during p 5 ), all points from all periods were added for each participant individually who could exchange them for one or more items from a gift list. In the control condition, students entered a draw for having worn the accelerometer correctly. At the end of each experimental period (p 1 -p 4 ), these participants randomly earned 100, 80 or 60 points (with 1/3 chance of each), irrespective of their physical activity performance. The expected payoff per period (for all p t ≥ 1 ) for a random student in all conditions, including the control, was 80 points. The total expected payoff from all periods (p t ≥ 0 ) was 420 points (min = 340 points, max = 500 points).
results
Following standard processing practices in child-based accelerometry 40, 41 , data before 07:00 and after 23:00 were excluded and nonwear time was removed. An additional filter excluding days with less than 10 hours of valid wear time left 9,776 valid days with a mean of 28.1 days (95% confidence interval CI 95% [13.4, 42.8] [20.9, 47.9] participating in each experimental condition (see Supplementary Table 2 ). Classes did not differ with respect to their network characteristics (that is, density, centrality, transitivity and reciprocity; see Supplementary Notes: Network analysis). The mean valid wear time per day was 814 CI 95% [633, 996] , and this did not differ significantly between conditions (Kruskal-Wallis 42 , χ 2 (4) = 9.042, P value = 0.0601). Overall, participants wore accelerometers significantly longer (≥ 60 min) on weekdays than on weekend days (Mann-Whitney non-parametric ranking 43 test (henceforth M-W): z weekend = 5.042, P value < 0.001). All tests used in this analysis (including the above two) are two-tailed.
Cut points identified in ref. 38 were used to classify time spent in sedentary (≤ 100 c.p.m.), light (101-2,295 c.p.m.), moderate (2,296-4,011 c.p.m.) or vigorous intensity physical activity (≥ 4,012 c.p.m.) ( Fig. 2) . To check the robustness of our main findings, different cut points were used to classify the same data (see Supplementary Fig.  2 ). We used minutes of moderate intensity and above (MVPA) as a comparability measure 36 . Because of the sex-specific design and sex differences observed in MVPA (M-W for all periods: z all = 7.238; M-W for p 0 periods z p0 = 4.948; P values < 0.001), the data were analysed and presented separately for boys and girls ( Fig. 3 ). Significant daily MVPA fluctuations of the actual mean MVPA (black line) (Kruskal-Wallis test 42 for difference among different weekdays: χ 2 (6) = 72.157, P value < 0.001) have been smoothed by displaying the estimates of a locally (bandwidth: 0.3) weighted regression of MVPA on experimental days (red line). Figure 3 shows the significant differences in children's MVPA on different days of the week, different weather conditions, and between holidays and school days (see M-W tests in Supplementary Information). These persistent environmental effects render statistical adjustment necessary.
In Fig. 4 , we average out all these effects by pooling data from both phases (A) and all experimental periods (B) for each of the different experimental conditions (by sex). To account for the different number of observations in the two experimental phases, we weighted each observation with the inverse of its probability of being sampled in experimental phase 1 or 2 (that is, assuming the same number of observations by treatment and sex in each phase; see Supplementary  Fig. 3 for non-balanced sample). The estimates of the locally (bandwidth: 0.3) weighted regression of MVPA on experimental days are presented in part A, with dotted left and right line-extensions indicating preliminary (p 0 ) and post-experimental (p 5 ) periods, respectively. Information from these two non-incentivized periods is not included in the calculation of the pooled average MVPA from all periods, illustrated by bar graphs (part B). Red error bars correspond to CI 95% of the respective subsamples (see also Supplementary Fig. 4 for box-plots). M-W tests on MVPA between different treatments (see Supplementary Table 3 ) confirm that for boys, team rewards consistently and significantly elicit higher levels of MVPA than the control scheme in both experimental phases. For girls, this was the case for the direct and indirect reciprocity schemes. 
Fig. 1 | rewarding, interactions and allocation of points in the social-rewards schemes.
A hypothetical scenario of nine classmates is presented. a, Rewarding for physical activity performance. Red, blue and green upper rectangles represent children's relative physical activity performance in the classroom in one period and correspond to 100, 80 and 60 points, respectively. b-d, Points allocation in social-rewards schemes; each red, blue and green slice (arrow) corresponds to 50, 40 and 30 points allocation (transfer), respectively. b, Direct reciprocity scheme: each child divides his/her points between two partners and receives half of the points that each one of these partners generated. c, Indirect reciprocity scheme: each child divides his/her points between two partners and receives half of the points that two other partners generated. d, Team scheme: the points of three partners belonging to the same team are added to a common pot and then shared equally among the partners.
We used a multilevel hierarchical model to control for all observed (weather, weekends, holidays) and unobserved environmental effects in a more systematic way and allow the variance of the unit effects to be estimated conditional on the data and parameters at all different nested levels. In particular, we estimated a threelevel mixed effects model in which repeated daily measurements (level 1) were nested within the same child (level 2) who was nested in one of the classrooms (level 3) participating in the study. Four different dummies, one for each different condition (IV, individual; DI, direct reciprocity; IND, indirect reciprocity; TE, team rewards) were included in the fixed part of the model together with the dummy variable fem indicating females and the continuous variable val_time indicating the daily minutes of valid accelerometry wear time. The control condition (random rewards) was omitted and functioned as a baseline level. Cross-classification of the repeated within-subject measurements was also handled in the fixed part of the model by including 73 day-dummies, Dum t (that is, (37) valid experimental days × (2) experimental phases) − (1) the baseline day). Most importantly, using time-dummies in the fixed part of the model also served for controlling for all observed (weather, holidays, weekend and so on) or unobserved environmental effects.
With regard to the random part of the model, in the classroom level 3 we included a random coefficient for sex (u 0j + u 1j × fem jt ) accounting for the different sex composition of the different classrooms and the sex-specific weekly relative scores and thresholds. In the child level 2 we simply included a random intercept υ 0ji . Finally, we accounted for heteroskedasticity by classroom in the level-1 repeated measurements by adding 19 independent residual errors (ε jit ), one for each classroom (that is,
) (see Methods and Supplementary methods). The resulting model, additionally including the interactions between the different conditions and sex, is described by the following equation: Table 1 shows the coefficients, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of the main variables (IV, DI, IND, TE, fem) of the fixed part in equation (1) (see Supplementary Information for the complete regression analysis). In M1, team incentives and direct reciprocity have a positive and significant effect on MVPA (β 4 = 4.93, P value = 0.001, CI 95% [1.99, 7 .88] and β 3 = 4.30, P value = 0.010, CI 95% [1.05, 7.56] respectively), corresponding to improvements of 67.1% (β 4 /β 0 ) and 58.5% (β 3 /β 0 )), respectively, as compared with the control condition (captured by β 0 ). Indirect reciprocity also had a positive effect, but this was marginally non-significant (β 2 = 2.69, P value = 0.061, CI 95% [− 0.13, 5.50]). Pooling data from all socialrewards schemes together (IND, DI and TE) into one common regressor in M2, we found that, in general, social incentives had a positive and significant (β 2-4 = 3.81, P value = 0.001, CI 95% [1.50, 6.12]) effect on MVPA, with a 51.8% higher value than the control condition. In contrast, MVPA in the IV scheme was found not to be significantly different (β 1 = 2.30, P value = 0.093, CI 95% [− 0.38, 4.97]) from the MVPA in the control condition.
Including interaction terms between different conditions and sex (M3), we found that the effect of the team rewards on boys' MVPA was very high and significant (β 4 = 8.77, P value < 0.001, CI 95% [4.63, 12.92 ), corresponding to a 131.5% (β 4 /β 0 ) increase compared with the control condition (β 0 ). Although for girls the effect of team rewards was non-significant (β 4 + β 405 = 2.53, χ 2 (1) = 2.02, P value = 0.1555), the direct reciprocity scheme affected girls' MVPA significantly (β 3 + β 305 = 5.441, χ 2 (1) = 5.82, P value = 0.0159) and positively (76.5% improvement compared with control ((β 3 + β 305 )/ (β 0 + β 5 ))). Direct reciprocity did not affect boys' MVPA, and indirect reciprocity was also non-significant for both boys and girls (only marginally (β 2 + β 205 = 3.195, χ 2 (1) = 3.27, P value = 0.0706) for the latter). When combining all social-rewards conditions in M4, we found that social-rewards schemes had a positive and significant effect on MVPA both in boys (β 2−4 = 4.375, P value = 0.002, CI 95% [1.60, 7.15]) and in girls (β 2−4 + β 205−405 = 3.346, χ 2 (1) = 6.15, P value = 0.0132). The individual incentives, however, did not significantly impact MVPA for either sex. The significant increases in MVPA in males in the team scheme (β 4 = 11.20, P value < 0.001, CI 95% [6. 23, 16.18] ) and in females in the direct reciprocity scheme (β 3 = 4.21, P value = 0.040, CI 95% [0.20, 8.23]) are confirmed when running the equation (1) regression model for the two separate sex subsamples (column M53 to M56 in Supplementary Table 5 ). Finally, on testing for post-experimental effects (see Supplementary methods and  Supplementary Table 7 ), we found that whereas MVPA in all social incentives return to their initial levels (that is, no significant differences between MVPA pre from p 0 and MVPA post from p 5 ), interestingly, the MVPA post in the individual scheme was significantly lower than the corresponding MVPA pre . As we discuss later, this result is probably partly driven by students' enthusiastic and over-reactive behaviour at the beginning (p 0 ) of the study due to the Hawthorne 44 or demand 45 effects.
Discussion
Two main points may be inferred from our findings. First, unlike individual schemes, social-rewards schemes were found to have a significant overall effect in changing preadolescents' physical activity behaviour, translating into 24.4 additional minutes of MVPA per week (as compared with the control). Second, the different social-rewards schemes have asymmetric effects in boys and girls. Boys were more susceptible to the team incentives, achieving an additional 59.2 minutes of MVPA in a week compared with controls, whereas girls were more receptive to the direct reciprocity scheme, achieving an additional 36.9 minutes of MVPA per week. It is important to stress here that these two findings are net from any design effects already introduced (but not measured) in the control condition (for example weekly point system and final rewards, performance feedback, relevant positioning in the classroom, game spirit or accelerometer use). Moreover, through regression analysis, we statistically controlled for any environmental effects that could potentially influence participants (for example weather or holidays) or school classes (for example influence by school directors or teachers, also known in the literature as Hawthorne effects 44 ).
Although we cannot claim that our design entirely excludes selfinterest (incentives that are directly linked to individual payoffs) from the social-rewards schemes (for example, participants may comply to 'peer-pressure' for increasing their individual payoffs by reducing 'social' sanctions), the results from the individual reward scheme indicate that self-interest itself is not a significant driver of behavioural change in this situation. In contrast, induced peerpressure (probably together with other confounding factors, such as image scoring 46 , and observability power 9 ) has an additional effect on the participants' time spent in MVPA, as seen with the socialrewards schemes. To understand the sex differences between the different social-rewards schemes, we should focus on the interplay between the different interactions induced (by design) and the different characteristics of the pre-existing sex-segregated networks.
Boys appear to maximize their MVPA performance when exposed to the team-competitive environment of the team rewards scheme, a result that is in agreement with a well-established finding in the literature 6, 7 that male preadolescents are in general more interested than females in playing team games and forming larger networks 5, 47 . Interestingly, our within-classroom network analysis (see Supplementary Notes: Network analysis) also shows that, Blue, yellow and green shadowed days/periods highlight, rainy (precipitation more than 5 mm), warm (temperature higher than 10 °C) and holidays days/ periods, respectively. compared with girls, boys are more frequently characterized as good or best friends (τ ij ≥ 4) and have a more central role (higher closeness) in the overall network and in the sex-specific network within a classroom. In contrast, girls maximized their MVPA performance under the direct reciprocity scheme. This result can also be related to the preference of preadolescent females for small intimate groups 4,6 , usually including two or three reciprocal friendships 48 . In our dataset, we also find that although girls have fewer 'best friendships' , these friendships are more frequently reciprocated than in boys. We would argue that as direct bilateral interactions are more common within girls' intimate friendships, girls were therefore more responsive to direct reciprocity interaction schemes than boys.
As a robustness check, we repeated our regression analysis (see Supplementary Table 6 ) using (1) an alternative activity-time classification, characterizing MVPA according to the cut points proposed by Freedson and colleagues 49, 50 , (2) a less conservative filter including the accelerometer-delivery days (Wednesdays) with at least 5 hours of valid wear time (1,359 additional observations) and (3) an additional control for the initial physical activity levels of the participants. In all cases, our sex-specific findings were retained.
Our study used randomly chosen independent small social networks to compare different incentive schemes and interaction structures for increasing physical activity in preadolescents; however, the work does have limitations. Although schools were located in different villages, they were all from a small geographical zone, which makes it difficult to prevent contamination and also challenges the external validity of the study. On the other hand, recruiting subjects from the same area also reduces socioeconomic differences between schools (at an aggregate level), and minimizes other environmental effects. At a disaggregate level (students), however, we were unable to control for potential socioeconomic differences, which could be affecting the effectiveness of the network intervention. For instance, during the 'pairing' process we took into account the sexbased homophily, but we were unable to take other characteristics into account (for example socioeconomic status, racial or ethnical identification). This could have potentially affect the structure of the network (due to homophily) and therefore affect the intervention outcomes.
Moreover, the existence of other within-classroom environmental factors related to the methods, and most importantly with the conductors or monitors 44 of the experiment, should be treated with caution as they might have an impact on children's behaviour, especially at the start of the study. However, we argue that these reactivity effects 51 decline over the course of our 7-week study and are eventually overshadowed by the interventions' actual effects. To address this point specifically, we repeated the analyses using only the data collected during the third period of the experiment, as subjects have already been exposed to the monitors for 3 weeks, there is no end-of-the-game effect, and this period lasts for two consecutive weeks (with no feedback or researcher contact). Here, our main sexspecific results were also retained (see Supplementary Table 6 column M64). Finally, owing to significant sex differences in MVPA, it was impossible for us to test the possible implications of our network interventions on mixed-sex groups, which may be a topic of interest for future research.
Our design also allows us to draw conclusions on post-experimental effects, as we measured physical activity for an additional week after the intervention period (when subjects did not receive additional points or prizes). As in many other intervention studies focusing on post-experimental effects [51] [52] [53] and on the effectiveness of intrinsic (versus extrinsic) incentives 16, 17 , we also found that physical activity levels in our social incentives schemes returned to preexperimental levels (no significant differences between MVPA pre and MVPA post ; see column M72 of Supplementary Table 7 ). This result primarily suggests that our intervention did not create lasting change in norms but was completely contingent on the socialrewards scheme. However, our post-experimental analysis further reveals that the activity levels of those in the individual incentive scheme were significantly lower in the post-experimental than the pre-experimental period (− 7.57 minutes per day (P value = 0.002, CI 95% [− 12.37, − 2.78]). In contrast, participants in the social incentives schemes simply returned to their initial physical activity levels. This implies that at least in relative terms, social incentives were more sustainable than individual incentives.
As the primary focus of this trial was not to study the persistence (or not) of post-experimental effects, we are unable to provide evidence-based explanations for these findings but instead hypothesize on the reasons. The researchers observed and teachers confirmed that in the pre-experimental period, students were very enthusiastic about participating and particularly interested in and curious about their 'magic box' (accelerometer). This observation gives reason to believe that pre-experimental performance might be higher than 'normal' performance because of Hawthorne 44 and demand effects 45 . This would imply that, compared with 'normal' levels, the post-experimental performance might actually be higher in social incentives (and, comparably, not as low in the individual incentives). As our design does not allow controlling for 'normal' physical activity level, this is only a conjecture based on our observations in the field, which would need to be tested with a different experimental design.
Our network interventions were conducted in two steps. In the first step, we elicited within-classroom social networks and fixed the interaction structures (between same-sex friends of the same pairs or teams) which remained 'locked' until the end of the study. In the second step, we simply induced peer-pressure among friends within the locked structures by attributing and exchanging points as a result of engaging in MVPA. It is likely that the interaction structures in the social-rewards schemes would normally change after the first interactions if they were not enforced by design. For instance, high performers would most probably seek to team up with other high performers to achieve higher rewards, or popular students could have benefited from their extensive network by grouping with highperforming best friends, exchanging their social capital for a higher return in terms of game-points 15, [26] [27] [28] . By using locked interaction structures, we sought to create a situation in which peer-pressure was the only reaction mechanism for any child seeking to increase his/her rewards; s/he simply had to encourage her/his partners to be more active. It is important to add that we did not observe any bullying effects against the weak performers. In contrast, teachers informally reported an increase in the quality of social behaviour among children.
The results indicate that sex-specific network interventions might be a powerful tool to positively change lifestyle behaviours of preadolescents, with boys being more susceptible to team interaction structures and girls to dyadic reciprocal structures. Changing usual behaviour and habits is complex, and this achievement may signal that this approach may have different applications in tasks of equal complexity. However, our network interventions may not be as effective in eliciting change in behaviours of a different nature. For instance, in our study we took advantage of the inherited competitive nature of physical activities (especially in the school environment), which may not be relevant for other sorts of behavioural change (such as substance use). In a more abstract context, carefully designed network interventions based on the specific characteristics of the social networks and the nature of the bilateral relations and interactions may constitute a powerful tool for achieving behavioural change.
Methods
Recruitment. Students were recruited from 19 fifth-grade elementary-school classes in the same geographical region in Italy to minimize environmental effects. Over 98% of children provided signed parental informed consent ( Supplementary  Fig. 5 ) and participated in the study. (Four parents did not sign the informed consent and their children did not participate in the study. One student dropped out because of health issues unrelated to the study.)
No prior sample size calculation was performed. The size of the sample was determined by the project's capacity and practical restrictions such as the number of available accelerometers (about 180 devices) and the number of recruited classes (19) . To increase the sample size, the intervention was performed twice (winter and spring experimental phases). Supplementary Table 2 shows these subsample sizes by gender, classes and phases. The final sample size (and the respective size of subgroups by gender, classes, experimental conditions and phase) was sufficient to perform non-parametric (Mann-Whitney, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis) and parametric (multilevel hierarchical model) analyses and testing, even when the data were collapsed at subject level (one observation per individual).
Network data elicitation and teams/pairs formation.
The strength of all dyadic ties (τ ij ) between classmates i and j was elicited through a teacher-administered self-reported questionnaire in which participants rated individually each one of their classmates (see Supplementary Fig. 6 ) from 1 "… is not my friend" to 5 "… is one of my best friends" (1 ≤ τ ij ≤ 5). In Supplementary Fig. 7 , we use modern multidimensional scaling 54 to visualize spatial distance only between best friends (τ ij = 5). Separate colours highlight boys and girls, while we also illustrate all friendships of τ ij ≥ 3. These graphs demonstrate that most networks are sex-segregated.
The network data was used for the formation of interacting teams or pairs only in the social-rewards schemes. Same-sex classmates with relatively strong ties (τ ij ≥ τ ji ≥ 3) were randomly matched (only two exceptions where τ ij ≥ 3 ≥ τ ji ). Considering that school networks were characterized by sex homophily (see Supplementary Figs. 7, 8 ) and that students would probably self-select to pair or team up with same-sex colleagues, we followed this natural predisposition and induced same-sex matching, which also allowed us to control for known sex differences in children's physical activity levels 36 . Matching relatively strong-tied classmates was purposely designed to maximize peer-pressure between relatively close friends 24 and also to minimize the possibility of adverse effects between distant friends. Pseudo-randomization was preferred to self-selection matching to ensure compatibility in the matching process for all classmates even in the most complicated interaction schemes (that is, indirect reciprocity).
Experimental phases, periods and conditions. The study was conducted in two experimental phases in 2014, with ten classes (from seven schools; classes from the same schools participated in the same condition) participating in the winter phase (N w = 176) and nine different classes (from eight schools) in the spring phase (N s = 173). Principal teachers served as contact points between students and researchers throughout the experiment to preserve students' anonymity (teachers were not informed about the performance of the students throughout the whole experiment; see Supplementary Fig. 9 for teachers' instructions). In both phases, after a 1-week preliminary period (p 0 ), schools were randomly assigned to different intervention conditions which were conducted in parallel for five more consecutive weeks divided into four periods: three 1-week (p 1 ,p 2 and p 4 ) and one 2-week (p 3 ) period. As researchers required knowledge about the experimental condition to prepare and deliver the corresponding feedback, data collection and analysis were not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments. However, the main outcome measure is objectively measured, and therefore researcher bias is unlikely to have influenced its assessment. The study concluded with a 1-week post-experimental period (p 5 ) in which students did not receive any kind of incentive (points). Classification medals were given virtually and corresponding to 100, 80 and 60 points in all but the control condition (in which random allocation of points was used). The different experimental conditions implemented in the classes defined the points allocation rules among classmates. In the IV scheme, participants received the points corresponding to their own classification medal. In the social-rewards conditions, however, points were not allocated to the 'self ' but to other classmates (Fig. 1) , who bilaterally satisfied (with two exceptions) the condition τ ij ≥ τ ji ≥ 3 (henceforth "partners"). In the DI and IND schemes, each individual was engaged in two active and two passive interactions; s/he was sending half of her/his points to one partner (point-taker) and the remaining half to another point-taker, while receiving half of the points of one partner (pointgiver) and half of the points of another point-giver. In the IND, each participant was interacting with four different partners, whereas in the DI they interacted with only two partners who were simultaneously point-givers and point-takers. Open network structure was imposed on all same-sex networks assigned to DI, by preventing an individual's point-givers/takers from interacting with each other. However, in the IND, the open network structure condition was satisfied only for those same-sex IND networks with N ≥ 10 (4 out of 6). For the remaining two IND networks, we allowed interaction between point-givers and point-takers but never within point-givers or within point-takers. Finally, in the TE scheme, three partners were assigned to the same team and engaged in a public goods game 39 in which the points of all team members were gathered together and then shared equally among them. (accelerometers and conditions) . Special attention was given to explanation of the instructions, both to the teachers and to the students. Teachers received general instructions about their role in the conduct of the experiment during the recruitment period. Supplementary Fig. 9 shows the written instructions given to the teachers responsible. Before the experiment, researchers also organized an interview with each teacher to be sure that they accurately understood the general instructions. Moreover, researchers met teachers weekly in school during the collection/delivery of the accelerometers and answered any questions raised by them or by the students.
Instructions for the game
For the instructions to the students, we used a 'game' language (for example, we use the term "magic box" instead of accelerometer) which was easier for the students to understand. Instructions were given in two stages so that students were not overwhelmed with new information. In the first stage, participants were instructed at the beginning of p 0 to wear the accelerometers on a belt on their right hip, during all waking hours (except for water or contact sports) throughout all periods (and p 5 ), including weekends. As well as the written illustrated instructions (see Supplementary Fig. 10 ), researchers gave a small demonstration in the classroom for the correct use of the accelerometers. In the second stage, incentive-instructions and classmate grouping/matching (where applicable) were revealed to students at the beginning of p 1 . In the social incentive schemes, students received their partners' names and it was described in detail how their behaviour could potentially affect their partners' points. In addition, we attached a personalized keyring to each child's accelerometer, which indicated the names of his/her partners (when applicable). In Supplementary Fig. 11 we show the exact information received by the students.
At the beginning of period p 2 when researchers (through teachers) gave the students their first feedback (corresponding to their performance in p 1 ), there were only a few cases in the social incentive schemes in which students reported that they had not understood the interaction scheme with their partners. The further information given at that stage (see Supplementary Fig. 13 ) was enough to erase any confusion, as in the next week (beginning of period p 3 ) teachers did not receive any further questions about the interaction schemes and assured the researchers that all students already knew their partners and were aware of how the points were distributed or exchanged. The students participating in the random rewards scheme found it most difficult to understand that their points were independent of their performance. However, after receiving further information at the beginning of p 1 , this was resolved. Supplementary Table 6 (column M64) demonstrates that our main results were retained even after excluding these potentially 'noisy' periods.
Physical activity measurement and feedback. Physical activity was measured by accelerometers (GT1M, GT3X or GT3X+ ; ActiGraph) and was communicated individually to classmates as minutes of intensive physical activity (examples were given in the classroom, and from p 1 participants could also observe it in the provided histogram-feedback). Accelerometers were handed out at the beginning of each period (Wednesday, 12:00), and collected at the end of the period (Tuesday, 08.00) for data extraction, recharging and feedback preparation (see Supplementary Fig. 1) .
At the beginning of each period (for all p t ≥ 1 ), participants received individual information (see Supplementary Figs. 12,13) 
4. The points obtained based on their (or on their partners') performance in p t -1. In the social-rewards schemes, participants were also informed about the medals and points of their partners. This three-category medal system was designed to dampen competition (after p 1 , all students could potentially reach T t H and win the gold medal)) which, if too extreme, could cause negative side effects (for example hostile behaviour towards high performers). This reward system proved successful as teachers reported no conflicts among students but an increase in team spirit, especially for those participating in the team condition.
Instruction intelligibility for 9-11-year-old students was a key challenge of this study, owing to the complexity of the interaction schemes. We addressed this issue through repeated interaction with teachers and students before and during the experiment, and by offering clear instructions and feedback on a regular basis. In Supplementary Fig. 1 , we show the timeline of the experiment, highlighting in red letters all the occasions when researchers interacted with teachers and students during the experiment. After p 1 , teachers reported that students did not have any more questions and that they fully understood the rules of the game.
Experimental payments. As well as the points earned in p 1 -p 4 , participants received a 100-point bonus at the end of p 0 for correctly wearing accelerometers. Irrespective of condition, points from all periods (p t ≥ 0 ) were summed at the end of the experiment (during p 5 ) for each participant individually. The student could then exchange the points for one or more items from a gift list including 94 items of different points-value (see Supplementary Fig. 14) . This was also true for the control condition, in which students earned 100, 80 or 60 points with 1/3 winning probability after a lottery draw at the end of each experimental period (p 1 -p 4 ). The expected payoff per period (for all p t ≥ 1 ) for a random student in all conditions, including the control, was 80 points, with the total expected payoff from all periods reaching (p t ≥ 0 ) 420 points (min = 340 points, max = 500 points). By providing all participants with the same size of material incentive, we ensured that any resulting differences between students participating in different experimental conditions would be due to the different intervention scheme and not to the size or the material incentive itself. Hence, material incentives were included as a methodological tool for quantifying physical activity performance while their effectiveness 55 does not constitute an objective of this study.
Physical activity data collection and filtering. Accelerometers were set to record at 10-second epochs, and data from the accelerometers were downloaded using ActiLife software (version 5.7.4, full edition). Data before 07:00 and after 23:00 were excluded, and non-wear time was removed, using a criterion of consecutive runs of zero c.p.m. for a minimum duration of 60 minutes, allowing for a 'spike tolerance' of 2 (refs 36, 38 ) . Remaining data were included if accelerometer wear time was at least 10 hours per day. The application of this last filter removed all delivery and recollection days and left our sample with a total of 9,776 valid days (see Supplementary Figs. 15,16 and Supplementary Table 1 ). At least three independent school classes were assigned to each experimental condition, with an average of 35.4 females and 34.4 males participating in each condition (see Supplementary  Table 2 ). The mean number of valid days per individual was 28.1 (SD), with only TE being significantly different (P value < 0.01 in all between-conditions bilateral Mann-Whitney non-parametric ranking 43 tests including the TE) from the other schemes, mainly owing to the late involvement of two TE classes. The mean number of valid minutes per day was 814 (SD), which did not differ significantly between conditions (Kruskal-Wallis χ 2 = 9.042 with 4 d.f. and P value = 0.0601). However, accelerometers were worn for significantly longer (≥ 60 min) on weekdays than on weekend days (M-W: z weekend = 5.042, P value < 0.001).
Regression analysis.
We performed regression analysis to control for any environmental effects in a systematic way. The dependent variable was the total daily minutes in MVPA. To capture treatment effects, we used the following four dummy variables as the main regressors for our model:
• IV: takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation of the individual rewards scheme, otherwise 0. • DI: takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation of the direct reciprocity scheme, otherwise 0. • IND: takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation of the indirect reciprocity scheme, otherwise 0. • TE: takes value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation of the team rewards scheme, otherwise 0.
Note that these dummies take the value 0 for all those measurements recorded during p 0 and p 5 when all children either received the 100-point bonus or received no points at all. The dummy variable 'control' , taking the value 1 for all those measurements recorded during the implementation of the control scheme, is used as control group for our regressions and therefore omitted from the regression table.
We used a multilevel model (using maximum-likelihood estimator) to allow the variance of the unit effects to be estimated conditional on the data and parameters at all different nested levels (school-class(j) > student(i) > measurements(t)). In particular we used a three-level mixed effects model in which repeated daily measurements (level 1 or t-level) are nested within the same child (level 2 or i-level), who is nested in one of the classes (level 3 or j-level) participating in the study. Treatment dummies were included in the fixed part of the model together with the dummy variable fem indicating females and the continuous variable val_time reporting the number of validated daily minutes. We filtered out all data with val_time ≤ 600 minutes. Cross-classification of the repeated within-subject measurements was also handled in the fixed part of the model by including 73 daydummies, Dum t (that is ((37) valid experimental days × (2) experimental phases) − (1) the baseline-reference day). Using time-dummies (Dum τ , τ ∈ [1,74]) in the fixed part of the model also enabled controlling for all observed (weather, holidays, weekend and so on) or unobserved environmental effects.
With regards to the random part of the model, at the class-level we included a random coefficient for sex (fem) to account for the differences in sex composition of the different classrooms, expecting classes with a high percentage of males to have a higher average classroom performance. The random sex coefficient also accounted for the fact that although boys and girls in the same classroom were allocated to the same condition, their relative performance and weekly thresholds were sex-specific. We also allowed for the random effects at level 3 to be correlated (general symmetric covariance matrix). At level 2, random effects accounted for heteroskedasticity by classroom at the measurements level (see Supplementary  Table 4 , column M43). Note that heteroskedastic residuals at this level also captured phase-heteroskedasticity, as each class participated in either the first or in the second experimental phase. See Supplementary Information for regression model and post-hoc testing and diagnostics. Data distribution in this analysis was assumed to be normal, but this was not formally tested. In Supplementary  Fig. 18 , we show the actual residuals distribution. As compared to the normal distribution, the distribution of our residuals is slightly skewed on the left (0.83) and leptokurtic (5.56).
Ethical approval. Ethical approval was given by the Experimental Economics Research Ethics Committee, Joint Research Centre, European Commission. The regional representative office of the Italian Ministry of Education (Ufficio Scolastico Territoriale per la Lombardia) authorized the study in the schools of its territory and coordinated the collection of parental informed consent. The experimental design was also approved by the European Data Protection Supervisor, who approved the study with respect to the data protection rights of the participants. All relevant approvals and documents are available upon request.
Code availability. The code (.do files) used in our statistical analysis and image production is available upon request from the corresponding author. 
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Statistical parameters
When statistical analyses are reported, confirm that the following items are present in the relevant location (e.g. figure legend, table legend, main text, or Methods section).
n/a Confirmed
The exact sample size (n) for each experimental group/condition, given as a discrete number and unit of measurement An indication of whether measurements were taken from distinct samples or whether the same sample was measured repeatedly
The statistical test(s) used AND whether they are one-or two-sided Only common tests should be described solely by name; describe more complex techniques in the Methods section.
A description of all covariates tested A description of any assumptions or corrections, such as tests of normality and adjustment for multiple comparisons A full description of the statistics including central tendency (e.g. means) or other basic estimates (e.g. regression coefficient) AND variation (e.g. standard deviation) or associated estimates of uncertainty (e.g. confidence intervals)
For null hypothesis testing, the test statistic (e.g. F, t, r) with confidence intervals, effect sizes, degrees of freedom and P value noted Our web collection on statistics for biologists may be useful.
Software and code
Policy information about availability of computer code
Data collection
Physical activity was measured by Actigraph accelerometers (either GT1M, GT3X or GT3X+; ActiGraph, Pensacola, FL.)
Data analysis
StataCorp. 2015. Stata Statistical Software: Release 14. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP and Microsoft Excel 2010 was used for the statistical analysis. ActiLife (version 5.7.4, full edition), ActiGraph's (ActiGraph, Pensacola, FL.) data analysis software platform was used to extract and filter the data For manuscripts utilizing custom algorithms or software that are central to the research but not yet described in published literature, software must be made available to editors/reviewers upon request. We strongly encourage code deposition in a community repository (e.g. GitHub). See the Nature Research guidelines for submitting code & software for further information.
